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INTRODUCTION 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs, a federal agency, directly services 
approximately 1.5 million American Indians who reside on 
approximately fifty-six million acres of reservation land across the 
United States.1  Of this number, in 2001, 403,714 were employed and 
nearly one-third of this number lived below the poverty line.2  The 
average health, life expectancy, and education of Indians also lag behind 
the rest of America.  The infant mortality rate is markedly higher than 
the rest of the population at 8.3 deaths per thousand as apposed to 6.9 
for the rest of the population of the United States.3  The death rate due 
to intentional self harm for Indians is 2.6% contrasted with 1.3% for 
Whites and 0.7% for Blacks.4  The Indian’s average life expectancy of 
73.5 years is still lower than the rest of the nation.5  With regard to the 
educational status of Indians living on reservations, only 11% of Indians 
have completed undergraduate or professional degrees, whereas 24.4% 
of the United States population has completed one or both degrees.6 
Interestingly, the numbers above show some improvement in Indian 
life in the near past.  For example, the number of Indians who are 
enrolled in universities or colleges increased 26% between 1990 and 
2000.7  Further, the infant mortality rate in 1955 was 62.7 per 1000 births 
(whereas it was 8.3 as of 2000).8  It is clear, however, from this 
incomplete listing of statistics, that many Indians still live in dire 
circumstances. 
All is not lost for American Indian tribes.  This article presents one 
possible solution to the issue of Indian poverty:  the creation of 
sovereign chartered research groups that would be shielded by tribal 
sovereign immunity.  In reaching this conclusion, this paper will begin 
with an overview of patent law, state sovereign immunity, tribal 
sovereign status, and tribal sovereign immunity.  Finally, it will end with 
a discussion of how tribes can take advantage of their sovereign status to 
 
1. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PERFORMANCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 11 (Fiscal Year 2005), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/bia/BIA_PAR_2005_FINAL_02242006_web.pdf. 
2. Id. at 7. 
3. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 19 
(5th ed. 2005). 
4. Id. at 18. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 20. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 18-19. 
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start research groups that could, potentially, bring greater investment 
potential and wealth into the tribes. 
I. PATENT LAW 
The body of patent law finds its origins in the U.S. Constitution.  
Specifically, Article I, section 8, clause 8, grants Congress the power to 
enact legislation that would promote the advancement of science and 
the arts by granting limited monopolies on their respective works.9  The 
exact wording is as follows: 
 
The Congress shall have power . . . To promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries[.]10 
 
The most current major legislative work intended to protect the 
discoveries of inventors was embodied in 1952 as the Patent Act.  It laid 
out the vast majority of what is, today, considered to be patent law. It 
exists in Title 35 of the U.S. Code and is implemented in Title 37 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations.  The main section that is the most 
relevant to this discussion is 35 U.S.C. § 271.  This section relates to the 
definition of infringement and the partial text is reproduced here: 
 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention during the term of the patent 
therefor, infringes the patent. 
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be 
liable as an infringer. 
(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or 
imports into the United States a component of a patented 
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a 
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, 
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same 
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an 
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing 
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 
 
9. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
10. Id. 
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(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement 
or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right 
by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) 
derived revenue from acts which if performed by another 
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement 
of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts 
which if performed without his consent would constitute 
contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his 
patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement; 
(4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or 
(5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale 
of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in 
another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view 
of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the 
relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the 
license or sale is conditioned.11 
 
The term of the contemporary patent is twenty years from the filing 
date of its application.12  This gives a tremendous financial advantage to 
the patent owner who controls the manufacture or development of the 
patented invention for a long period of time. However, there are 
exceptions to that patent owner’s ability to seek redress for 
infringement of his intellectual property rights. 
II. EXPERIMENTAL USE EXCEPTION 
At this time, it is prudent to take a moment to discuss the 
experimental use exception.  The experimental use exception has been 
crafted mostly out of case law.13  It is exceedingly narrow and largely 
only covers those uses that are for philosophical inquiries.14  The 
commercial use of a patented idea, even if done by a non-profit research 
institution, is still infringement and cannot be availed of this protection– 
therein lies the rub.15  Many of the projects that universities and other 
 
11. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
12. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
13. Denise W. DeFranco, Carla Miriam Levy, & Miriam L. Pogach, The Experimental 
Use Exception:  Looking Towards a Legislative Alternative, 6 J. HIGH TECH L. 93, 94 (2005), 
available at 
http://www.law.suffolk.edu/highlights/stuorgs/jhtl/publications/V6N1/defranco_note.pdf. 
14. Id. at 95. 
15. See id. at 98; see also Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
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research entities undertake exceed that of mere philosophical inquiry.16  
Indeed, many of these projects are for eventual commercialization, 
which was the reason for the funding in the first place.17  It is in this light 
that sovereign immunity protection becomes such a crucial component 
of state chartered research institutions. 
Although not about state chartered research organizations, the 
Roche v. Bolar18 case had significant impact on the experimental use 
policy of the United States.  In this case, Bolar was a manufacturer of 
generic drugs and was interested in creating a generic alternative to the 
brand name Dalmane drug.19  In order to do so, Bolar used one of the 
patented Dalmane chemical compounds prior to the expiration of the 
patent.20  Bolar did this to compare the efficacy of their generic 
compound to the patented compound.21  Once Roche got wind of this 
activity, they sued Bolar for patent infringement.22  To the dismay of 
Bolar, the court found that the activity was entirely commercial and 
therefore Bolar was unable to avail itself of the protections of the 
experimental use doctrine.23 
Congress was not pleased with the result of this case.  Therefore, to 
protect the interests of generic drug manufacturers in experimentation 
prior to the expiration of the patent holder’s rights, Congress enacted § 
271(e)(1).24  The text of this addition is as follows: 
 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, 
or sell within the United States or import into the United States 
a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary 
biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is 
primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant 
RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site 
specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law which regulates the 
 
16. DeFranco, supra note 13 at 98-99. 
17. Id.  (citing Ruth E. Freeburg, Comment, No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use:  
Is It Time for Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools?, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 351, 405-06 (2005)). 
18. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
19. Id. at 860. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 863. 
24. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
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manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological 
products.25 
 
Following Roche, the next important case with regard to the 
experimental use exception is Madey v. Duke University.26  In Madey, 
the plaintiff was a professor who was let go from his position by the 
defendant Duke University.27  However, the university continued to use 
inventions covered by two patents that the plaintiff owned.28  The 
plaintiff, displeased with the ongoing activities of the university, filed 
suit for patent infringement.29  The university argued that its use was 
protected by the experimental use exception as it was merely using the 
patents for research purposes and that it was a nonprofit organization; 
the district court held in favor of the university.30  However, to the 
dismay and horror of many research organizations, the appellate court 
reversed, finding for the plaintiff.31  In doing so, it countered that the 
experimental use exception was extremely narrow and only meant for 
“satisfy[ing] idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical enquiry.”32  The 
court went on the say that although many projects are initially 
completed for purely research oriented goals, they move on to feeding 
lucrative businesses.33  The exact related quote is as follows: 
 
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is 
engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is 
in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is 
not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very 
narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense. Moreover, 
the profit or non-profit status of the user is not determinative.34 
 
In short, the courts have held that the experimental use exception is 
indeed exceptionally narrow.35  As one can see from these cases, the 
 
25. Id. 
26. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
27. Id. at 1352-53. 
28. Id. at 1353. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 1355. 
31. Id. at 1360. 
32. Id. at 1362. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
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advantage of having one’s research work shielded from patent 
infringement liability is quite significant.  It is also one that only 
sovereigns, or organizations chartered by sovereigns, can enjoy.  This 
lays the scene to discuss the current state of state sovereign immunity in 
the United States. 
III.  STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Although not a direct analogue of tribal sovereignty, the treatment 
of state sovereignty can give some guidance on how courts would 
construe the limits of tribal sovereignty.  State sovereign immunity finds 
its basis in the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  The text 
of the Eleventh Amendment is as follows: “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”36  In plain language, the Eleventh Amendment provides states 
with immunity from suit unless the state consents to the suit or waives 
its immunity.  To a limited extent, some states have limited their 
immunity from certain actions through legislative action.37  Specifically, 
some states have tort statutes that allow citizens to get relief in the 
situation where the state injures a given actor.38 
The issue of sovereign immunity and, more importantly, what is 
considered a waiver has been recently revisited by Congress.  In an 
attempt to abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity with regard to 
patent law, the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy 
Clarification Act (“Plant Patent Act”) was enacted.39  The act 
specifically altered 35 U.S.C § 271 (adding § 271(h)) such that states 
were accountable for the infringement of patents.40  The exact text of § 
271(h) is reproduced below: 
 
 
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
37. See University of Georgia Cooperative Extension Overview of the Georgia Tort 
Claims Act, http://extension.caes.uga.edu/training/intro/lesson4/policies/torts.html (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2008).  See also Posting of Finch McCranie, LLP to Georgia Injury Lawyer Blog, 
http://www.georgiainjurylawyerblog.com/2007/02/a_welcome_erosion_of_sovereign.html 
(Feb. 15, 2007) (Georgia provides an example of such a waiver). 
38. Id. 
39. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-560, 160 Stat. 4230, http://faolex.fao.org/docs/html/Usa11039.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 
2008). 
40. 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (2000). 
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(h) As used in this section, the term “whoever” includes any 
State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee 
of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official 
capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or 
employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this title in the 
same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental 
entity.41 
 
It was this unilateral action that was reviewed by the Supreme Court 
in Florida Prepaid42 which this paper argues extends the holding of the 
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida43 case to the intellectual property 
arena.44 
While not an intellectual property case, the Seminole Tribe decision 
established that Congress cannot unilaterally abrogate a state’s 
sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Act.45  Prior to 
Seminole Tribe, Congress crafted the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act.46  This act forced states to negotiate with tribes in good faith under 
the threat of being sued in federal court.47  The Seminole Tribe felt 
aggrieved by the State of Florida’s refusal to enter into such 
negotiations.48  As a result, the Tribe took Florida to federal district 
court.49  The state moved for dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment, 
and the district court declined to dismiss the case.50  The case was 
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals who, in turn, 
reversed the district court’s decision.51  The Supreme Court heard the 
case on October 11, 1995, and affirmed the appellate court’s decision 
that the Eleventh Amendment applied in this circumstance – Congress 
could not unilaterally abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity unless 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.52 
The preeminent case on the intersection of sovereign immunity with 
 
41. Id. 
42. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999) [hereinafter Fla. Prepaid]. 
43. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).   
44. See infra Part VI. 
45. Id. at 47. 
46. Id. at 48. 
47. Id. at 47. 
48. Id. at 51-52. 
49. Id. at 51. 
50. Id. at 52. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 59, 76. 
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intellectual property is the Florida Prepaid case.53  Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educational Expense Board issues certificates of deposit 
to students to pay for college expenses.54  The College Savings Bank is 
the owner of a patent that discloses a similar method of paying for 
college tuition.55  Following the enactment of the Plant Patent Act, 
College Savings Bank filed a suit against Florida Prepaid for patent 
infringement.56  It was clear that Florida neither waived its immunity, 
nor consented to the suit.57  The Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that 
Florida was protected from federal suit by its sovereign immunity under 
the Eleventh Amendment.58  The holding is as follows: 
 
Congress made all States immediately amenable to suit in federal 
court for all kinds of possible patent infringement and for an 
indefinite duration. Our opinion in City of Boerne discussed with 
approval the various limits that Congress imposed in its voting 
rights measures, see 521 U.S., at 532-533, and noted that where 
“a congressional enactment pervasively prohibits constitutional 
state action in an effort to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional 
state action, limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress’ 
means are proportionate to ends legitimate under § 5,” id., at 
533. The Patent Remedy Act’s indiscriminate scope offends this 
principle, and is particularly incongruous in light of the scant 
support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress 
intended to remedy. In sum, it simply cannot be said that “many 
of [the acts of infringement] affected by the congressional 
enactment have a significant likelihood of being 
unconstitutional.” Id., at 532. 
The historical record and the scope of coverage therefore make 
it clear that the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under § 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The examples of States 
avoiding liability for patent infringement by pleading sovereign 
immunity in a federal-court patent action are scarce enough, but 
any plausible argument that such action on the part of the State 
deprived patentees of property and left them without a remedy 
under state law is scarcer still. The statute’s apparent and more 
basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy for patent 
 
53. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627. 
54. Id. at 631. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 635. 
58. Id. at 647. 
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infringement and to place States on the same footing as private 
parties under that regime. These are proper Article I concerns, 
but that Article does not give Congress the power to enact such 
legislation after Seminole Tribe.59 
 
This decision by the Supreme Court has been narrowed by later 
decisions by lower courts.  Specifically, the concept of waiver has been 
expanded to include vehicles that the state would not normally expect, 
such as that signed between the parties in Baum Research and 
Development Co. et al. v. University of Massachusetts at Lowell.60 
Baum Research and Development Company filed suit against the 
University of Massachusetts for alleged breach of contract and patent 
infringement.61  Prior to the suit, and at the commencement of business 
activities between the parties, the University signed an agreement that it 
would be bound by applicable laws of Michigan, and that the university 
would submit to jurisdiction in the appropriate state or federal courts 
seated in Michigan.62  Upon suit, the university asserted Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit.63  The district court, based upon the 
agreement signed by the parties, declined to find for the state’s 
immunity.64  The lower court bifurcated the claims, and the case went 
forward on the breach of contract claim.65  The appellate court affirmed 
the lower court’s decision.66  The decision of the court is as follows: 
 
The University does not deny that it had authority to enter into 
this contract with Baum, but argues that Baum must 
affirmatively prove that the Massachusetts legislature delegated 
to the University the authority to include in the contract a waiver 
of immunity in federal court should dispute arise. We do not 
discern error in the district court’s careful consideration of the 
issues. There was no assertion by the University that it does not 
have authority to enter into patent license agreements; the 
assertion was that Baum must prove the University’s authority to 
include the particular provision III–3. Indeed, in pressing this 
argument the University does not assert that it acted illegally. 
 
59. Id. at 647-48. 
60. 503 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
61. Id. at 1369. 
62. Id. at 1368. 
63. Id. at 1369. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 1372. 
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Instead, it asserts that Baum has the burden of proving that it 
acted legally. We discern no support for the thesis that the 
University’s contract authority must be proved, when the 
University does not deny that authority.  At the trial, Director 
Griffin testified at length as to the origins of this contract, her 
negotiation of the terms, and its approval by several University 
lawyers. No issue was raised that she and the University 
exceeded their authority in negotiating and signing this contract, 
including provision III–3. Although the University thereafter 
suggested the issue to the district court, it was devoid of any 
support. 
The district court did not err in its ruling that the contract 
provision III–3 was a clear and unambiguous consent to the 
jurisdiction of a Michigan federal court for disagreements arising 
from this license agreement.  That ruling is AFFIRMED.67 
 
Beyond waiver, states have been recently held to be liable for acts 
conducted in a regulated market.  The case MCI Telecommunications 
Corp. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.68 is an exemplary example of this. 
In MCI Telecommunications Corp., the plaintiffs were 
telecommunications providers that brought suit against a local exchange 
provider and its commissioners under the Telecommunications Act.69  
The defendants raised Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in a 
motion for dismissal, and the district court granted the motion.70  The 
plaintiffs appealed, and the appellate court held that participation in the 
regulatory scheme constituted waiver of a state’s sovereign immunity, 
such activity did indeed exist, and that the state’s sovereign immunity 
was thereby abrogated by its participation.71 
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The jurisprudence in the area of tribal sovereignty provides a rather 
interesting study.  Depending upon the era from which the Supreme 
Court decisions originate, tribes were construed to be either sovereigns, 
dependent sovereigns, or effectively non-sovereigns.  It is with this 
colorful case history that I begin my analysis of the current state of 
tribal sovereignty and how that impacts their ability to utilize sovereign 
 
67. Id. 
68. 222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2000). 
69. Id. at 327. 
70. Id. at 331, 334-36. 
71. Id. at 348. 
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immunity to defend against patent infringement claims. 
The first court to consider the concept of tribal sovereignty was the 
Marshall Court in Johnson v. M’Intosh.72  In that case, Johnson 
purchased land from an Indian Tribe.73  After this transaction, the U.S. 
government issued a grant to M’Intosh for the same parcel of land.74  
Johnson sought the ejection of M’Intosh from the land.75  The dispute 
revolved around whether the sale by the Tribe gave better title than the 
land grant of the U.S. government.76  In a decision authored by the Chief 
Justice, the Supreme Court held that the title from the U.S. government 
was inherently superior to the title given to Johnson through his 
purchase of land from the Tribe.77  In coming to this conclusion, the 
Court held that the U.S. government held a free title to those lands that 
they had discovered, regardless of the original inhabitants.78  Ultimately, 
under the logic of this decision, tribes could only sell or give their land 
to a discovering sovereign, and this right was waived once the land was 
discovered.79  Without doubt, this decision stripped Indian tribes of one 
of the most important aspects of a sovereign: the right to hold and 
transfer land. 
The next court to decide on the issue of tribal sovereignty was the 
Marshall Court in Worcester v. Georgia.80  In this case, Georgia required 
that all persons who were white to obtain a state license “to reside 
within the limits of the Cherokee nation.”81  A number of missionaries, 
including Worcester, refused to get said license.82  Worcester was 
thereafter sentenced to four years of hard labor for his failure to 
comply.83  In a widely cited opinion, Chief Justice Marshall held that 
Georgia lacked the authority to exercise its laws over the Indian Tribe.84  
In other words, the Supreme Court upheld the Indian Tribe’s right to 
self government.  Interestingly, the actual execution of this opinion was 
far from problem free with President Johnson reportedly responding 
 
72. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
73. Id. at 557-58. 
74. Id. at 560. 
75. Id. at 572. 
76. See id. 
77. Id. at 604-05. 
78. Id. at 592. 
79. Id. 
80. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
81. Id. at 523. 
82. Id. at 529. 
83. Id. at 532. 
84. Id. at 561. 
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that “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.”85  
However, beyond the extrinsic issues with the decision, it is still widely 
cited by courts and scholars.86  The fateful holding is repeated below: 
 
But the inquiry may be made, is there no end to the exercise of 
this power over Indians within the limits of a state, by the general 
government? The answer is, that, in its nature, it must be limited 
by circumstances. 
If a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in 
numbers, as to lose the power of self-government, the protection 
of the local law, of necessity, must be extended over them. The 
point at which this exercise of power by a state would be proper, 
need not now be considered: if indeed it be a judicial question. 
Such a question does not seem to arise in this case. So long as 
treaties and laws remain in full force, and apply to Indian 
nations, exercising the right of self-government, within the limits 
of a state, the judicial power can exercise no discretion in 
refusing to give effect to those laws, when questions arise under 
them, unless they shall be deemed unconstitutional. 
The exercise of the power of self-government by the Indians, 
within a state, is undoubtedly contemplated to be temporary. 
This is shown by the settled policy of the government, in the 
extinguishment of their title, and especially by the compact with 
the state of Georgia. It is a question, not of abstract right, but of 
public policy. I do not mean to say, that the same moral rule 
which should regulate the affairs of private life, should not be 
regarded by communities or nations. But, a sound national policy 
does require that the Indian tribes within our states should 
exchange their territories, upon equitable principles, or, 
eventually, consent to become amalgamated in our political 
communities. 
At best they can enjoy a very limited independence within the 
boundaries of a state, and such a residence must always subject 
them to encroachments from the settlements around them; and 
their existence within a state, as a separate and independent 
community, may seriously embarrass or obstruct the operation of 
the state laws. If, therefore, it would be inconsistent with the 
political welfare of the states, and the social advance of their 
citizens, that an independent and permanent power should exist 
 
85. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER:  THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 212 (1984). 
86. Bethany R. Berger, “Power Over this Unfortunate Race”:  Race Politics and Indian 
Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1974 (2004). 
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within their limits, this power must give way to the greater power 
which surrounds it, or seek its exercise beyond the sphere of 
state authority. 
This state of things can only be produced by a co-operation of 
the state and federal governments. The latter has the exclusive 
regulation of intercourse with the Indians; and, so long as this 
power shall be exercised, it cannot be obstructed by the state. It 
is a power given by the constitution, and sanctioned by the most 
solemn acts of both the federal and state governments: 
consequently, it cannot be abrogated at the will of a state. It is 
one of the powers parted with by the states, and vested in the 
federal government. But, if a contingency shall occur, which shall 
render the Indians who reside in a state, incapable of self-
government, either by moral degradation or a reduction of their 
numbers, it would undoubtedly be in the power of a state 
government to extend to them the aegis of its laws. Under such 
circumstances, the agency of the general government, of 
necessity, must cease.87 
 
The issue was later handled in United States v. Kagama.88  In a 
further attempt to assimilate tribes into mainstream American society, 
the plenary power of Congress over tribes was affirmed.89  The case 
involved Kagama being charged and found guilty of murdering another 
Indian on an Indian reservation under the Indian Appropriation Act of 
March 3, 1885.90  The Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s authority to 
pass legislation that would directly impact the liberties that tribes and 
their members had previously enjoyed. 
From these cases, the concept of Indian tribal sovereignty took some 
unexpected turns.  The Supreme Court in McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Commission held that the state of Arizona lacked the authority to 
apply a tax to Indians residing on a reservation and receiving income 
that is derived directly from the reservation land.91  In coming to this 
conclusion, the Court cited, among other things, the sovereignty of the 
tribes (although the Court also discussed the possibility of such 
sovereignty being derivative of the federal government).92 Eloquently 
stated by the court: 
 
87. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 593-94. 
88. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
89. See id. at 384-85. 
90. See id. at 376. 
91. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973). 
92. See id. at 172-73. 
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The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it 
provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but 
because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable 
treaties and federal statutes must be read. It must always be 
remembered that the various Indian tribes were once 
independent and sovereign nations, and that their claim to 
sovereignty long predates that of our own Government. Indians 
today are American citizens.93 
 
However, the Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe dealt a 
setback to tribal sovereignty when it held that the Tribe did not have 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.94  Then the Court in United 
States v. Wheeler appeared to affirm the existence of tribes as 
sovereigns in certain situations, but it held that double jeopardy did not 
apply to a man who was first tried and found guilty by an Indian tribe 
and subsequently tried by a state.95  Implicitly, in making this decision, 
the Supreme Court affirmed that tribes exist as a third sovereign beyond 
that of states or the federal government.96  Specifically, the Supreme 
Court had this to say about the sovereignty of Indian tribes: 
 
The powers of Indian tribes are, in general, “inherent powers of a 
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.” F. Cohen, 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 122 (1945) (emphasis in 
original). Before the coming of the Europeans, the tribes were 
self-governing sovereign political communities. See McClanahan 
v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 172.  Like all 
sovereign bodies, they then had the inherent power to prescribe 
laws for their members and to punish infractions of those laws. 
Indian tribes are, of course, no longer “possessed of the full 
attributes of sovereignty.” United States v. Kagama, supra, at 381. 
Their incorporation within the territory of the United States, and 
their acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of 
some aspects of the sovereignty which they had previously 
exercised. By specific treaty provision they yielded up other 
sovereign powers; by statute, in the exercise of its plenary 
control, Congress has removed still others. 
But our cases recognize that the Indian tribes have not given up 
their full sovereignty. We have recently said: “Indian tribes are 
 
93. Id. at 172. 
94. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
95. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328, 332 (1978). 
96. See id. at 328-29. 
REVISED 3-4-09 JEREMIAH BRYAR FINAL FORMATTED 3/4/2009  2:52 PM 
244 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 13:1 
 
unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over 
both their members and their territory. . . . [They] are a good 
deal more than ‘private, voluntary organizations.’” United States 
v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557; see also Turner v. United States, 
248 U. S. 354, 354–355; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, at 16-
17. The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique 
and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress 
and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, 
the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian 
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by 
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their 
dependent status.97 
 
Finally, in 1997, the Supreme Court in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
held that states should be accorded all of the Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity rights against tribes that are accorded to states for 
claims by Indian Foreign Nations.98  This decision implicitly affirmed the 
status of tribes as sovereigns.99  The holding is as follows: 
 
Our recitation of the ties between the submerged lands and the 
State’s own sovereignty, and of the severance and diminishment 
of state sovereignty were the declaratory and injunctive relief to 
be granted, is not in derogation of the Tribe’s own claim. As the 
Tribe views the case, the lands are just as necessary, perhaps 
even more so, to its own dignity and ancient right. The question 
before us is not the merit of either party’s claim, however, but 
the relation between the sovereign lands at issue and the 
immunity the State asserts. 
It is apparent, then, that if the Tribe were to prevail, Idaho’s 
sovereign interest in its lands and waters would be affected in a 
degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive 
levy upon funds in its Treasury. Under these particular and 
special circumstances, we find the Young exception inapplicable. 
The dignity and status of its statehood allow Idaho to rely on its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity and to insist upon responding to 
these claims in its own courts, which are open to hear and 
determine the case.100 
 
 
97. Id. at 322-23. 
98. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997). 
99. See id. 
100. Id. at 287-88. 
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It is quite apparent from this brief outlay of major cases regarding 
the sovereign status of tribes that the Court’s position on this matter has 
been far from consistent.  However, as evident from the latest of the 
cases above, the current legal opinion regarding tribal sovereignty is 
that they are domestic dependent sovereigns. 
V. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
One of the important decisions that defined tribal sovereign 
immunity was Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.101  In this case, the 
plaintiff filed suit against the Santa Clara Pueblo Tribe for violating the 
Indian Civil Rights Act.102  Specifically, the Tribe was declining to 
extend membership to the children of female members who married 
outside of the Tribe.103  The district court entered in favor of the Tribe, 
and the court of appeals reversed.104  The Supreme Court, in an opinion 
written by Justice Marshall, found that the Tribe was protected by its 
inherent sovereign immunity from suit.105  The exact holding is as 
follows: 
 
Congress retains authority expressly to authorize civil actions for 
injunctive or other relief to redress violations of § 1302, in the 
event that the tribes themselves prove deficient in applying and 
enforcing its substantive provisions. But unless and until 
Congress makes clear its intention to permit the additional 
intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such actions 
in a federal forum would represent, we are constrained to find 
that § 1302 does not impliedly authorize actions for declaratory 
or injunctive relief against either the tribe or its officers.106 
 
It is from this case that we can begin our discussion of how tribal 
sovereign immunity could be used by tribes to create research groups 
protected from patent infringement suits. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The Florida Prepaid decision showed that unless a sovereign is 
willing to opt into being liable for its actions, it cannot be taken into 
 
101. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
102. Id. at 51. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 54-56. 
105. Id. at 72. 
106. Id. 
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federal court for patent infringement.107  The implications of this are far 
reaching.  In the near term, it has given a clear advantage to state 
chartered research organizations and universities.108  However, while the 
application of this particular advantage has been largely shown in state 
universities, Indian tribes, which also are considered sovereigns, could 
potentially enjoy this advantage. 
An example of a state sponsored group taking advantage of 
sovereign immunity to protect it from patent infringement claims is the 
University of California.109  Not only has the university been an active 
player in the patent arena by amassing, over the past five years, 
approximately 2567 patents, but it has also been successful in reaching 
settlements in infringement suits against other entities.110  Over the past 
five years the University of California has made approximately 521 
million dollars in royalty and fee income over the same period.111  That 
particular university has garnered the reputation of being made out of 
TEFLON for just this reason.112 
California is not alone in its use of its sovereign immunity to shield 
research groups from patent infringement claims.113  As a state entity, 
the University of Wisconsin has both enjoyed sovereign immunity 
protection and been able to win a one million dollar patent licensing 
dispute with Xenon Pharmaceuticals.114  As one can see, as a result of 
the Florida Prepaid decision, which explicitly extended sovereign 
immunity protections to the patent realm, sovereign immunity provides 
a powerful shield against patent infringement.115 
Private universities and other non-state related research groups have 
not been pleased with these developments, especially in the aftermath 
of Madey v. Duke University.116  The previous darling of educational 
 
107. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627. 
108. Posting of Kevin E. Nooran to Patent Docs, The Wall Street Journal’s Problem 
with the U.S. Constitution, http://www.patentdocs.net/patent_docs/2007/11/the-wall-stre-
1.html (Nov. 14, 2007). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. See Abev: A Bird’s Eye View, http://abev.wordpress.com/2007/11/28/bulletproof-
teflon-patent-infringers/ (Nov. 20, 2007). 
113. Nooran, supra note 108. 
114. Posting of Stephen Albainy-Jenei to Patent Baristas, 
http://patentbaristas.com/archives/2007/11/ (Nov. 26, 2007). 
115. See generally, Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627. 
116. Cristina Weschier, The Informal Experimental Use Exception:  University 
Research After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1536-37 (2004). 
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institutions, the experimental use doctrine, has been shown to be 
exceedingly narrow – and in many commercial scenarios, completely 
unusable.117  Although the true implications of the case have yet to be 
seen, with many research groups knowingly casting a blind eye to patent 
infringement liabilities, private universities have been dealt a 
handicap.118 
This advantage becomes even more compelling as industry funded 
research has become more common.  Between the years of 1972 and 
2001, “industrial support to universities and colleges grew more rapidly 
than any other source of support for academic research and 
development.”119  Although research funding has dropped off slightly in 
recent years and federal funding has increased to offset the loss,120 
industry funded research remains a big player in many universities’ 
research and development.121  For example, in 2004, 450 institutions in 
the United States were receiving industry funding.122  In that same year, 
the total amount of research funding provided by industry was 
approximately 2.1 billion dollars.123 
As one can see from this information, industry sponsored research in 
the United States is a big business, and it is a business that Indian tribes 
can become involved in. With new income sources, such as independent 
commercial developments and gambling establishments,124 money could 
be funneled to the creation of research groups that, in the long term, 
would drive additional funding to the tribe.  Tribes have an excellent 
selling point, sovereign immunity, and could be poised to give state-run 
universities considerable competition in the future.  Although not 
necessarily a quantitative benefit, the development of research 
institutions could also provide incentive and motivation for Indians 
living on reservations to seek higher education to take part in these 
operations.  While this may seem far fetched now, the future creation of 
research institutions could become an integral part of the reservation 
infrastructure and allow the economy of tribes to become less 
 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 1538. 
119. Alan I. Rapopoa, Where Has the Money Gone? Declining Industrial Support of 
Academic R&D, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, at 1 (Sept. 2006), 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf06328/nsf06328.pdf. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 4. 
122. Id. at 2, fig.2. 
123. Id. at fig.1. 
124. See GETCHES, supra note 3, 25-27. 
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dependent on surrounding areas for income. 
 CONCLUSION 
Tribes within the United States have made large gains in the 
standard of living for Indians living on reservations.  However, the 
creation of sovereign chartered research groups will drive additional 
funding into the tribes, create jobs for tribal members, and bring hope 
into the lives of a people who desperately need it.  This is a potential 
option available to tribes and should be seriously looked at as a 
mechanism to allow reinvestment of income from other sources into 
tribal infrastructure. 
JEREMIAH A. BRYAR 
 
 
